1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION
3	CASE NUMBER 6:21-md-3006
4	IN RE:
5	TASIGNA (NILOTINIB) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
6	
7	ROBERT MERCED, ET AL., :
9	Plaintiffs, : Orlando, Florida
10	v. : November 15, 2022 : 10:00 - 11:09 a.m.
11	NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS : CORPORATION, :
12	Defendant. :
13	
14	TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROY B. DALTON, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16	AND THE HONORABLE DAVID A. BAKER
17	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND
18	THE HONORABLE RACHELLE L. HARZ NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE
19	
20	
21	Court Reporter: Amie R. First, RDR, CRR, CRC, CPE Federal Official Court Reporter
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25	Transcript produced by Computer-Aided Transcription.

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1 PROCEEDINGS **** 2 3 (Court called to order.) THE DEPUTY CLERK: 4 In Re: Tasigna Products 5 Liability Litigation versus Novartis Pharmaceuticals 6 Corporation, Case Number 6:21-md-3006. 7 Counsel, please state your appearances for the 8 record starting with the plaintiff. 9 MR. ELIAS: Attorney Elias for the plaintiffs. 10 Good morning. 11 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning. 12 MS. WICHMANN: Lawana Wichmann for the plaintiffs. 13 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning. 14 MR. SILVERMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Raymond 15 Silverman on behalf of the plaintiffs. 16 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning. 17 MR. OXX: Good morning, Your Honor. Chris Oxx on 18 behalf of the plaintiffs. 19 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning. 20 MR. BIGGS: Good morning, Your Honor. Harrison 21 Biggs on behalf of the plaintiffs. 22 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning. 23 MR. REISSAUS: Good morning. Andrew Reissaus for 24 Novartis. 25 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning.

Good morning. 1 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: 2 Hollingsworth for Novartis. 3 JUDGE DALTON: All right. Good morning. And I know we're missing Mr. Johnston this morning. He's 4 5 otherwise engaged. 6 JUDGE BAKER: And we have Judge Harz. 7 JUDGE DALTON: And we have Judge Harz, I think, on the phone checking in. 8 9 Judge Harz, are you with us? 10 JUDGE HARZ: Yes, good morning. Judge Harz is 11 here. Thank you. 12 JUDGE DALTON: Good morning, Judge. Welcome to 13 you. I hope things are well in New Jersey. Starting to 14 get cold up there, I suspect. 15 JUDGE HARZ: Well, we didn't have a hurricane 16 so --17 JUDGE DALTON: Yeah, well, there's that. 18 That's true. I told Judge Baker earlier this week true. 19 that it seems that all I need to do to summon one up is to 20 impanel a jury. Both times, both of our hurricanes have 21 been in the middle of criminal jury trials, which presents 22 some interesting challenges of sending people home and then 23 inviting them back. 24 Anyway, we're here for a status in the Tasigna 25 litigation. And I have had a chance to review your

proposed agenda and status briefing.

I guess maybe the first thing -- Judge Baker is with us here, of course, also -- is maybe to get an update on sort of the loose ends with respect to the wrap-up of fact discovery. And then I know you guys have had some -- you folks have had some issues with respect to how you're going to move forward on the case-specific discovery which I'll get to in a minute.

But, Mr. Elias, maybe I can invite you to the podium first. And tell me where you are in terms of wrapping up the loose ends of this out-of-time fact discovery that you all had agreed to do outside the close of discovery.

MR. ELIAS: Yes, Your Honor.

So I'm happy to report that we have concluded, at least from the fact discovery that was awarded to the plaintiffs, all of the depositions that we were -- fact witnesses that we wanted to take.

We have also disclosed all of our expert reports. And we disclosed, ended up disclosing four expert reports being very mindful of the Court's admonition at the beginning of this case to not be repetitive and to adequately cover all the areas we need to cover but not be redundant. So we have disclosed four expert reports and have concluded our depositions. Not the expert discovery,

which hasn't started.

And so from our perspective in terms of the discovery that we were awarded, we are in good shape.

JUDGE DALTON: Okay.

Well, let's talk about -- what about from

Novartis' position, Mr. Reissaus, do you all have any
outstanding issues with respect to either disclosure of
expert, expert reports, or wrapping up fact discovery?

MR. REISSAUS: Yes, sir. There's, I'd say, one outstanding issue. And just a little bit of background related to it.

So the Court previously ordered a 45-day extension of the general fact discovery of Novartis based on a third-party vendor that is doing data anonymization for clinical study data. And that work was completed within that extension, and plaintiffs had an expert that was working with that data, Dr. Madigan. And he had submitted a declaration and supported plaintiffs' motion to compel that discovery in the first place.

And as a part of plaintiffs' expert disclosures on October 18th, Dr. Madigan was tentatively disclosed.

And plaintiffs informed us that they — they were working on it with him still and were considering not serving the report. And we found out last week on November 7th that plaintiffs were withdrawing Dr. Madigan.

And, of course, Dr. Madigan's whole basis -- we extended the fact discovery by quite a bit to get discovery that was exclusively for Dr. Madigan. And Novartis incurred significant cost to provide discovery that only Dr. Madigan ended up not using.

So we had a motion to -- that we had filed to request cost shifting for that work. And Judge Baker denied that without prejudice at that time understanding that we needed to see what would happen once plaintiffs had that discovery.

Novartis would like to renew that motion now that we know that Dr. Madigan is not going to be an expert for plaintiffs. And we'd like to see cost shifting on that.

In terms of moving forward from there, we have -Novartis has its expert disclosure deadline today, and
we'll be serving our reports on time. And in terms of
wrap-up for the general discovery of Novartis, I think that
covers things.

Obviously, I can provide you an update on case-specific workup, but I don't know if you want to take a break before that and --

JUDGE DALTON: Okay. Well, I'm going to let -I'll let Judge Baker speak to whether or not he wants to
entertain a new motion with respect to cost shifting in
connection with that discovery. And we'll -- just put that

on your list and we'll circle back to that.

But let's talk a little bit about case-specific discovery, Mr. Reissaus, while you're up there.

Let me just share with you an observation before we start talking about the merits, is that I'm struggling when I go through your status reports, quite honestly, to try to imagine that there's seven hours' worth of deposition time necessary to depose a prescribing physician. Just the thought of that strikes me as facially abusive. Again, you know more about the case than I do.

I'm just telling you that's my initial reaction to that.

The other thing that struck me is that I — there's a little touch of irony in this, I guess, is that in trying to imagine that Novartis is going to repay the prescribing physicians for positing trust in their product and the health of their patient by subjecting them to seven hours of deposition time in a small conference room answering questions about their decision to prescribe the drug.

Just, again, you try the case any way you want to within reason, but I have to say that that seems to me to be counterproductive to your ultimate goal. I just can't imagine that you would need seven hours to take these depositions.

I appreciate that the plaintiffs would like to

have an opportunity to hopefully salvage something out of this discovery deposition that they might be able to utilize later on at trial and not have to redepose some of these prescribing witnesses or to have an opportunity, of course, to examine them themselves, to cross-examine them after the Novartis discovery.

I do think -- and I'm open to be persuaded that

I'm wrong, but I'll just share with you my initial reaction

is that Novartis ought to be entitled to take the

initiative with respect to the questioning on these

witnesses.

But what I'm inclined to do is to have you take the first two of these, send me the transcripts. Don't file them. Send them to me. I'm going to review the transcripts.

And if I find the process is being abused, the witness is being abused, you're overstretching your time, you're asking repetitive questions, you're being abusive to either counsel or the witness, then I'll fix it because I'm not going to put up with it.

But I think it's probably counterproductive for me to try to set down some deposition rules. You know, these docs are all going to be different, I suspect. Some of them are going to be very -- probably sympathetic and helpful to the plaintiff. Some are going to be mad that

they're there to begin with, don't want to be cooperative, don't want to be deposed, don't want to give you, you know, five minutes much less seven hours. And I suspect there will be some every place in between.

So I just wanted to put my cards on the table before you guys opened up and started telling me what you think ought to happen. So I'm disinclined to set down some hard-and-fast parameters that are going to apply to all the witnesses until I see how you're behaving. So that's my inclination.

But I'll be quiet now and let you speak, Mr. Reissaus.

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

And I can assure you that we don't want to disrespect the doctors or their time, that they're our client's clients.

We have been in contact with the offices of the prescribing physicians in the cases that are -- have been selected for limited discovery, and we've been working on getting dates. And obviously they have full schedules. They're taking care of patients with cancer and don't have a lot of free time, and we've been trying to work with their schedules.

We're getting lots of "Can we do it at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday?" "Can we do it on a weekend?" We're working

through that with the offices, making sure they understand that probably starting at 5:00 isn't the best time to start a deposition.

We're not going to go seven hours. We're trying not to. From our perspective --

JUDGE DALTON: Again -- and I know I said I was going to be quiet. But if you think about the practicality of what you just described to me, to ask, you know, the prescribing physician who really has, you know, probably -- I shouldn't say in every case, but probably no real dog in the hunt other than the health and safety of their patient, the efficacy of the drug in terms of the risk-benefit analysis, that whether or not they'd be inclined or disinclined to prescribe it going forward, whether they're happy or regretful of their decision to prescribe it in the first case, I suspect you're going to see some of all of that in the course of your discovery.

But, I mean, the prospect of getting these physicians, however many of them that you're expecting to line up, to sit in a small conference room and to suffer, you know, the inquisition of hour upon hour upon hour upon hour is not going to serve you well. I mean, it's not.

MR. REISSAUS: Yes, Your Honor. We agree.

And this is perhaps us just being -- covering our bases in case we have an exception, but we certainly aim to

complete the deposition much quicker than seven hours. And I would say we're aiming for less than half that.

That's subject to plaintiffs having questioning that could go on for a long time. I mean, we've talked with them. It appears they are looking to ask a lot of questions.

But we're working with the doctors. And we recognize they have limits to their schedules, and that's what we're going to work with.

One thing we've heard from the doctors is that they do not generally want to be doing this before the holidays, and they've -- we're getting responses that are pushing us into January and February.

And we're concerned that that's going to be a problem given that we have somewhere around 42 depositions that have to be taken between fact and expert depositions. And we only have 50 percent of the plaintiffs' dates as of today. So eight out of sixteen depositions we have dates for. And for the most part, those are falling toward January too. So we're getting tight on time there.

Also, you know, we had a plaintiff offer date that coincides with a prescribing physician, and we were informed this morning that plaintiffs aren't able to double-book that day and they can't cover two depositions.

JUDGE DALTON: Let me just -- let me try to

short-circuit this, because one of the things that I said when we began to talk about case-specific discovery was the prospect of, you know, are both sides prepared, frankly, in terms of having the resources, having the manpower, the womanpower, you know, to get these things done.

My concern was exactly what's happening right now, is that, you know, we're going to get into this case-specific discovery and we're going to have all kinds of scheduling problems and we're not going to have enough resources to cover it. I'm just not going to hear that.

I granted -- I allowed you to have the case-specific discovery in the limited number of cases I had that you were permitted to do it because I judged that to be a manageable number. And I thought it was fair, frankly, for Novartis to have an opportunity to begin to explore whether or not you were going to have a colorable defense on this question of causation in terms of whether or not the prescribing physicians would have moved forward with their advice notwithstanding whatever the list of potential adverse consequences was. So I'm not very sympathetic to the time problems that you're describing for me.

Just as I said, I suspect the physicians are not going to be happy about being deposed for seven and a half hours. They also will respond to a subpoena. They

will respond to a subpoena. So I expect these things to be worked out.

But I also want the physicians to know that this is not an RSVP-type of operation, you know. If the Court is going to permit them to be deposed, which I have, then they are going to need to be cooperative in terms of giving you dates and whether that means that the plaintiffs -- I suspect, at least based on my own experience of many years, that some of these physicians are happy to sit down and talk with the plaintiffs and work something out; others are not interested in talking to them at all; and there will be some that are somewhere in between.

But you all are going to need to figure this out within the time frame that you have. And for those physicians — if you run into physicians who are either unable or unwilling to give you a date, then you need to come see Judge Baker about it and get a court order giving them some direction in terms of what they need to do to make themselves available. Because it has to be done.

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE DALTON: Okay. Let me hear from your colleagues on the other side with respect to this case-specific discovery.

Is that going to be you, Mr. Silverman?

MR. SILVERMAN: It is, Your Honor. Thank you.

Good morning, Judge Dalton. Good morning, Judge Baker.

JUDGE DALTON: Good morning.

MR. SILVERMAN: So a couple of issues, I guess, to raise based upon what you said a moment ago, Your Honor.

And maybe I need a little bit of clarity with respect to what this period of time, this case-specific discovery period is supposed to entail.

So one of the issues that you saw in the status report that I believe Your Honor was just raising a moment ago was the question of priority of questioning and allocation of time for the depositions.

It's my understanding that Novartis intends -- let me take a step back. These are obviously equally if not more important depositions for the plaintiffs than they are for Novartis.

JUDGE DALTON: Well, it's interesting you say that because you resisted the discovery. I mean, you didn't want it to happen at all.

MR. SILVERMAN: Judge, I think what we resisted was doing it prior to the completion of general fact discovery or at least getting into general fact discovery so that we had some basis to be able to ask what we thought were some important questions of the prescribers.

If you remember at the last --

JUDGE DALTON: Well, again, Mr. Silverman, I don't want to joust with you.

MR. SILVERMAN: That's okay.

JUDGE DALTON: I don't want to joust with you, but as I recall the lay of the land the plaintiff was resistant to any case-specific discovery happening in the MDL proceeding and that the fallback position was certainly if it was going to happen it could not happen before all the fact discovery was completed, not so that you could be armed with questions but so that you could provide your physicians with the information with respect to the asymmetry of information in terms of what potential consequences were associated with the prescription, the use of this prescription drug, that may not have been known to the prescribers at the time that they made their prescription.

That's what was -- that's what you told me, that you wanted -- you said, We don't want the case-specific discovery. But if you're going to do it, don't do it until after all the fact discovery is closed so that at least the physicians know everything that we know about the potential bad effects of the prescription.

MR. SILVERMAN: That's 100 percent correct, Your Honor. That is.

JUDGE DALTON: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SILVERMAN: And if I did not state that clearly enough, my apologies. That is exactly what was meant.

And when we were here last time and the discussion had come up about doing some case-specific discovery in the MDL, it was plaintiffs' position that we were, in fact, ready to move forward with case-specific discovery. But what we had proposed was actually doing a more fulsome case-specific discovery to get cases worked up. Your Honor adopted what Novartis had been asking for for some time.

But my understanding, Your Honor, is that Novartis intends to use these depositions of prescribers to ultimately make motions for summary judgment based upon the learned intermediary defense. That is plaintiffs' burden to prove as an element of his or her failure to warn claim.

So these depositions are equally -- although it's been Novartis asking for them from the beginning, and somehow that has become that these are Novartis' depositions. They are equally important to us. We are -- if not more.

We are very concerned about the idea of getting an opportunity to ever redepose these physicians. In my experience, most of the time working with doctors like this or doctors of any kind, they will sometimes willingly, sometimes not so willingly, sometimes under power of a

subpoena come to a deposition but that is going to be the one and only time that they will seek to be deposed.

So considering the importance of these depositions, what we had proposed to Novartis, which we believe is also consistent with virtually every MDL or MCL case that I'm familiar with, is that we divide the time up evenly, 50/50, so that we have equal opportunity to depose the prescriber as they do.

And with respect to the priority of questioning, that we come up with some type of -- and there's several different ways, so to speak, to skin this cat but have a way where they lead on some of the depositions, we lead on others.

We could do it, we proposed, where it could be in the MCL we lead on the plaintiffs' picks, they lead on the defense picks, and then perhaps pick names out of a hat with respect to the MDL cases. But ultimately a fair division between them because we do believe that priority of questioning is something — if it wasn't something important to the parties, it wouldn't be something that's ultimately gone back and forth and negotiated in other MDLs.

So we are concerned that these, all of these depositions are going to ultimately become the basis for motions to dismiss, and we're going to be without the

necessary opportunity, both time-wise and through the benefit of priority of questioning, to depose these very important witnesses.

We had believed that what we were proposing to

Novartis was just fair on its face. It wasn't designed in
any way to be gaming the system. We didn't even come to

them and propose anything that we thought was more on our

side so that ultimately they met us in the middle. We just
said why don't we just divide it all up evenly. Their

response was to just flatly reject that and not even make a

counterproposal at all.

And so as we sit here, Your Honor, and there are certainly numerous examples in recent cases of precisely — and, frankly, the division of time, 50/50, for a prescriber or an implant or a medical device case is usually something that's agreed to between the parties.

Again, we're concerned that we're not going to get an opportunity to ever redepose these prescribers. These are going to be their one and only opportunity to take their deposition.

And as I said, as bearing the burden of proof on learned intermediary, I suggested to Mr. Reissaus during the meet and confer that if he wanted to, you know, take the majority of the time and have priority on every case, then we agree not to be moving at this time for, you know,

summary judgment on learned intermediary, and he wouldn't agree to that.

So we think that fairness dictates that we both be given an opportunity in some cases to lead. And I'd be open to other solutions on how to do that as well and also be given an opportunity to have a 50/50 split on the questioning, Your Honor. I think it's vitally important given these important witnesses.

JUDGE DALTON: Okay. So much of what I said, I guess, at the outset didn't hit its mark. And I'm not unsympathetic to your position that you need to have the opportunity for a fulsome exchange for the position to make your record. I think you're correct.

The whole purpose of these, at least one principal purpose of these, of my permitting these depositions was to, in fairness to Novartis, give them the opportunity to explore whether the record was going to support their assertion that the learned intermediary defense was going to break the causation chain and that they were going to be entitled to summary disposition based on the prescriber's testimony. So I'm not unsympathetic to anything that you just described.

But what I thought I said at the outset -- and, of course, I did describe it as my inclination, in fairness to you -- is that setting down some arbitrary rule now in

terms of either the allocation of the time or the priority of the questioning seems to me to be a little bit cart before the horse because I believe when you all actually start taking these depositions that the practicality of the circumstances is going to begin to insert itself into the proceedings and that you're going to figure it out. Right?

You're going to figure it out in such a way that you're going to split the time fairly, you're going to not abuse the witness, you're going to be respectful of the witness' time, you're going to be respectful of each other's relative positions. Maybe that's being, you know, cockeyed optimist from my standpoint.

But that's the reason that I suggested that maybe the way to go forward is let you all take a couple of these, send me the transcript. I'm going to look at the transcript. I have a lot of experience in this area. I can look at the transcript and pretty quickly figure out whether or not you're getting a fair shake, Mr. Silverman, in terms of how much time you're getting, whether or not allowing Novartis to take the lead is prejudicial to you or at least potentially prejudicial to you such that I need to adjust it going forward.

The only, the only fly in that ointment, it seems to me, is the lag time between the first two depositions that you take and getting me the transcript and letting me

react to that.

My hope is that by telling you that's what I intend to do you're all going to be on your best behavior because you know I'm going to be reading that transcript and I'm going to be looking at it closely.

And I'm going to be paying attention to, you know, are there a litany of, you know, uncalled for objections? Are the parties being obstreperous in terms of getting to the essence of the information? Are the questions repetitive? Are you bullying the witness? Are you talking on top of one another? Or are you acting as I expect you to act in a courteous, cooperative, professional way, getting the information that you need without asking the same question 15 times, without -- well, you know.

I mean, you've been in the trenches certainly long enough to know what abusive discovery is. I promise you I know it when I see it. Judge Baker knows it. And I'm sure Judge Harz knows it as well.

So it struck me that that might be the best way to go forward is just see how you do. If you meet my expectations and do well, we're not really going to have any problems. If you don't meet my expectations and you do poorly, I will fix it.

MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. And I appreciate the opportunity to be heard on this important

issue.

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JUDGE DALTON: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Silverman.

I don't want to nominate either -- Judge Harz, I'd be interested to know, you have so many more of these cases than we have. And I appreciate the fact that anything that, you know, I do may give you -- put you in a place where you don't want to be.

I want to give you an opportunity to speak to this if you have any thoughts on it that are different from what I've just described, because there's no particular pride of authorship in this.

I'm just reluctant to, at this stage of the game, at least in these cases, say, you know, divide the time evenly or impose some arbitrary limits on how much time other than the time that the rules provide for.

But I would love to have the benefit of your thinking on it.

 $\,$ JUDGE HARZ: I concur with you on it in regard to all those points.

The next issue having to do with the deceased plaintiff, after having reviewed the submission, it's so much more tilted towards the MCL cases that I don't know if you wanted me to ask the questions with regard to -- or what your feelings were with regard to that. Because I think there's only two in the MDL and all the other cases

are in the MCL.

JUDGE DALTON: Yes. I would like you to take the lead on that. Let me -- before I get to that, though, let me just check in with Judge Baker and see if he has thoughts on kind of where we are at this point.

JUDGE BAKER: Yeah, I hate to expose myself to a charge of being flippant, but what Judge Dalton has been talking about, I would characterize it as take two depositions and call us in the morning and see if you need further treatment. Because both sides are entitled to due process here subject to the constraints of case management.

I couldn't tell how serious the problems are scheduling the doctors and the lawyers and the other witnesses. And I think I mentioned this early on in the case. If you need a project management office to help you with that, I've done that. And it worked extremely well. I had the parties pay for to the effect of a third party to help with your schedules and the doctors' schedules and work through the HIPAA issues, if there are any. And if you need a HIPAA order, you know, get them to me and we can do what we need to do. But so that's out there.

I did kind of want to know the extent to which plaintiffs' counsel has been able to talk to the doctors and whether that influences how you're preparing for things.

Again, given the HIPAA constraints and the fact that, at least I assume, a number of the plaintiffs are still being treated by these doctors, there's a relationship there. The same thing, there's a relationship between pharmaceutical companies and prescribing physicians. Those are very different relationships and have different constraints.

But I'd certainly like to have a comment on that as to how that affects how you're approaching this.

MR. ELIAS: Sure.

On that issue, so my firm along with the Onder firm have the bulk of the cases in this MDL and in the MCL. And I can tell you, I don't think we've had success, in terms of the cases that fall into our responsibility, of speaking to any of the oncologists at this point. Our efforts aren't exhausted. Certainly, we would like to talk to them before the depositions. That's our duty to our clients to try to do so.

But the reality is, A, getting in touch with these folks is hard. And then it also depends on what kind of practice that they're involved in. When you're involved in a big practice, it goes right to a lawyer for, you know, for the organization and the lawyer says talk to them at the deposition.

So I can tell you from our perspective, we don't

anticipate being able to talk to a lot of these doctors prior to the deposition. We will, I'm sure, be able to talk to some.

And I don't speak for Mr. Silverman. I do think his firm has been able to talk to one or two. But yeah, that's the reality. For many of these depositions, the first time that we will ever be speaking to these doctors is at the deposition.

JUDGE BAKER: And, of course, some doctors don't like to talk to lawyers under any circumstance unless they've each got a cocktail in their hands, so I understand. And it's not a litigation setting, so I understand that.

All right. Do you want me to take up this issue of the motion, renewing the motion?

JUDGE DALTON: Yes.

JUDGE BAKER: I recall the issue. And I really did -- it's one of those where I pushed it forward, not wanting really -- I really did want to know what the lay of the land was going to be. So if you want to renew that, how soon can you get the motion in?

MR. REISSAUS: I was going to propose December 1st, get us past Thanksgiving.

JUDGE BAKER: That's fine.

Usual time for response from the plaintiffs?

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MR. SILVERMAN: That's fine, Your Honor.
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             JUDGE BAKER: All right. So I'll take that up in
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    December when it's ripe.
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             MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             JUDGE DALTON: What about this -- just in terms of
    the schedule, when would be -- when would you expect that
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    you will have a couple of depositions taken of the
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    prescribers?
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             MR. REISSAUS: The first prescriber deposition we
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    have scheduled is December 21st. I think the next one
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    is in January. January 13th.
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             JUDGE HARZ: Are you doing these depositions by
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    Zoom, or are counsel intending on going to the location
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    where the physician is?
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             MR. REISSAUS: Novartis' intent is to appear live
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    for those depositions, to sit down with the doctor.
             JUDGE HARZ: Okay.
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             MR. REISSAUS: We think it will work more smoothly
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    that way.
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             JUDGE HARZ: Okay.
             MR. ELIAS: And plaintiffs' intent, we're possible
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    to attend in person as well.
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             JUDGE HARZ: Understood. Thank you. I just
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    wanted to know.
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             JUDGE DALTON: So here's what I'm going to require
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that you do, because I'm concerned about the time, is I'm going to require that you order these transcripts, the 23rd and the 13th, on an expedited basis and that you split the cost of expediting the transcript.

And deliver those to my chambers. Don't put those on the docket. Deliver those transcripts directly to my chambers.

And you can instruct the court reporter once they've been expedited, even if they've been -- even if reading and signing has been reserved, just go ahead and tell her to send me the transcript prior to that. In other words, as soon as it's available.

Because it won't be used for any purpose other than for me to see how you're doing. And I'm concerned about too much time passing before I get a chance to look at kind of how things are moving forward.

Judge Harz, do you want to talk about the death cases?

JUDGE HARZ: Sure.

From the submission, it was very clearly laid out there were just three categories involved, you know, cases filed in the name of the plaintiff who died prior to the filing, which I think is a more serious issue right now; and then cases for which it's a purported personal representative; and cases with a named plaintiff who was

alive when the Complaint was filed but has since died.

I'm not sure -- I recognize that plaintiffs say with regard to the first group that they want to have -- well, let me be quiet and hear from plaintiffs and defendants.

Why don't I hear from the defendants first regarding your position about the cases filed in the name of a plaintiff who died prior to the filing of the Complaint because I'm anticipating we're going to have to have written submissions on this.

MR. ELIAS: Did you ask to hear from the defendants?

JUDGE DALTON: She wants to hear from Mr. Reissaus first, from Novartis.

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

So with regard to the cases involving a named plaintiff who was predeceased, so deceased at the time the Complaint was filed, we don't object to plaintiffs dismissing those cases without prejudice and refiling them.

Our purpose in including that in the part of our proposed CMO is that we've seen in recent filings, actually in federal court, one of the Middle District cases, where this is an issue, where this is a recurring thing. And we want to make sure that we have some procedures set for these cases in case there are new cases that come up with

the same problem.

Right now we have 17 cases in this category.

Hopefully they can be resolved based on plaintiffs'

agreement. But, again, we are requesting a CMO because
this could come up again for that category.

Would you like me to address the other categories, or do you want to limit it to this one right now?

JUDGE HARZ: I'd like to hear the plaintiffs' response to what you just said with regard to category one. It would be easier to handle that way.

MR. ELIAS: Yes, Your Honor. This is Richard Elias. And I -- hopefully this won't be an issue.

We do agree that those cases need to be dismissed and refiled. And I don't -- 17, I'm not sure that's the number. But whatever the number is, we have told Novartis. And that was our response in the email which is attached to the pleadings that, you know, once they get us -- or once we agree to a joint stipulation of dismissal, we will dismiss this case without prejudice and then refile.

And these are -- I'm not sure exactly how that slipped our scrutiny, but we are going to ensure that that doesn't happen again.

JUDGE HARZ: Oh, that's fine.

And I just see the email. It was just I didn't see a response to that email. So that's why I thought this

was going to be an issue of contention, but I'm glad I'm 2 wrong. Okay. 3 MR. ELIAS: Okay. JUDGE HARZ: All right. Then this is a nonissue 4 5 then? MR. ELIAS: That first category is a nonissue. 6 7 JUDGE HARZ: Oh, great. MR. ELIAS: I'm happy to address the others. I 8 9 don't think we would have any issues. JUDGE HARZ: Great. Let me hear from -- great. 10 11 Let me hear --12 MR. ELIAS: Okay. So the second category are 13 cases where they want proof of personal representation. 14 The cases were properly filed in the name of a 15 representative, and they're just looking for proof of 16 personal representation or proof of representation and 17 appointment. And we are -- as we stated in our letter, we 18 are working on getting those. And we'll make sure that 19 those papers are in proper order and we will get those over 20 to them. 21 And then the last category is the category of 22 plaintiffs who have died since the case has been filed, 23 which I think is the most problematic for us, because they 24 want to enter an order in the MDL which governs primarily 25 an issue -- I think it's exclusively an issue in the MCL

right now where there is some sort of requirement that plaintiffs' counsel files a suggestion of death upon learning of the death of the plaintiff and then there being some sort of a time limit imposed that would -- for a motion for substitution. And if that wasn't timely filed, then the case would terminate. And so we definitely have a problem with that.

First of all, that's not the procedure in

New Jersey. In New Jersey the case continues unabated as
we've cited in the email that we sent.

JUDGE HARZ: Yes.

MR. ELIAS: And on motion of any party, a substitution can occur.

In the federal case, there is no requirement that under Rule 25(a) that a plaintiff, upon deceased, that their counsel or the plaintiff or the personal representative of the plaintiff file a suggestion of death. In fact, the Middle District of Florida has said that would be highly unusual because it's not required for a motion for substitution and it sets off — and it could potentially prejudice the estate because it sets off a time line in which the case can be distinguished — extinguished.

And secondly, the Court in the Middle District of Florida has pretty clearly set forth that plaintiffs'

counsel is not competent to file suggestions of death on the record.

So in both federal and state court, when a plaintiff dies the case continues unabated. There should be a motion for substitution. Those will be made, but we certainly don't want any time line that imposes — any artificial time lines that are not set forth in the rules that could potentially extinguish our client's claim. We don't think that that's called for and we think the order that they're proposing is an overreach in that regard.

JUDGE HARZ: I saw the proposed order.

I mean, obviously, it's in the interest of the plaintiff and plaintiffs' counsel to have, you know, the appropriate administrator or executor, whatever it be, be put in place.

I recognize that depending upon what county you're in or what state you're in, these things aren't necessarily done within the same time frame. Sometimes they're done very quickly. Sometimes it takes forever.

Why don't I hear from defense counsel -- well, let me ask you, I think it was Mr. Elias that was just talking.

Are you saying we don't need an order or we should have an order in place but without these specific time lines and without the suggestion of death?

MR. ELIAS: I don't think we need an order at all.

JUDGE HARZ: Okay.

MR. ELIAS: I think we continue to work through the process as the rules envision. And, you know, these are complications that are present in MDLs and MCLs like this. And we will follow the rules and continue to work through that way. I don't think an order is in place.

And if there was an order, certainly we would need to weigh in on what we think that order should look like because it wouldn't look like what was proposed by the defendants.

JUDGE HARZ: Okay. So why don't I hear from defense counsel, why do you think we need an order?

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

We're requesting an order here because this is about managing the docket and the cases in an orderly way within a -- in New Jersey, a multicounty litigation, and here in the MDL.

The basic question of is there a plaintiff to pursue the claims in the Complaint, that's a threshold issue. We should not have to look at a PFS. We should not have to produce a DFS in the situations where there is not a party appearing.

And all three of these categories raise serious questions about whether there is someone to pursue the claims in the Complaint. So the first category we've dealt

with already, that's the most obvious.

But the second, you know, the cases that Mr. Elias said were properly filed in a representative capacity, that isn't necessarily the case. And it isn't the case for some of these. We know that for a fact.

And we're asking for an order that sets a procedure that holds plaintiffs' counsel to making sure that they follow the steps necessary to make sure that someone with standing is actually appearing. Because if a judgment is going to be entered in any of these cases, we need to have the proper party.

JUDGE HARZ: Oh, of course. Of course, you need to have the proper party there. I'm just -- I'm just hesitant to put a time frame on it at this juncture.

I mean, I'm assuming -- Mr. Elias, is it a fair statement that your offices are coordinating and all plaintiffs' counsel are coordinating to put in motion everything that has to be done to get the appropriate representatives in place?

MR. ELIAS: Yes, Your Honor, that is a fair representation.

JUDGE HARZ: Okay. Wouldn't it suffice to say that in four months' time maybe we could have a report on this, because maybe, you know, three quarters of the cases at that point in time will have already had the appropriate

substitution?

I think we should -- I'm not saying no. I recognize the issue. And I realize there's this problem. But to just have an arbitrary time frame put in for when these substitutions have to be made, I'm not comfortable with that because it's not within the attorneys' control. It's not like they have control over the surrogate court or whatever court they have to deal with to get those papers processed.

Would it be fair to say that we could revisit this in four months and at that point you can let me know how many cases you believe there isn't an appropriate representative named plaintiff?

I mean, because the case does continue unabated.

I mean, that is the rule. That is the procedure. And
there is no judgment being entered right now. It's not as
though money is being disbursed and where's the money going
or we need a release signed. We're not at a critical point
like that.

MR. REISSAUS: Your Honor, Mr. Elias misstates the law that applies to his cases that are in the second -- well, the third category. An action does not abate when there is a surviving party.

So in the context where a Complaint is filed in the name of the patient and the spouse, if the patient

passes away and the spouse has their own independent claim and is a party to the suit that's already filed, in that instance, the rule Mr. Elias cites 4:34-1(a) applies. However, that is not the case in the filings that we've identified in the MCL.

A different rule, subsection of that rule, applies. It's 4:34-1(b), which is the section for non-party survivors. And that rule states: If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the Court shall on motion order substitution of the proper parties.

And so we're asking for an order to require plaintiffs to take the steps necessary to substitute in a proper party here.

JUDGE HARZ: I mean, I don't think anyone is disagreeing with that. And the plaintiffs are already doing that.

My problem, if that's what you want, I'm not comfortable with giving them a set time frame and then if they don't do it by a certain period of time the case is dismissed with prejudice. I'm not going to do that. They don't have control over when those papers will be necessarily finally processed.

That's why I'm saying, I have no problem entering an order indicating that all activity must, you know, commence to get things in motion and that there should be a

report to the court, say, in four months, but I'm not going to give them a time frame by which it must be completed.

I'm just not.

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

If I may say, our point is not to extinguish claims where actions are being taken to open an estate in a proper place to get the party with the legal authorization to pursue the claim. That's not the intent of this order.

This order is to make sure that that process is started now. Four months from now if we find out that plaintiffs have not taken the proper steps, not begun to, this will drag out a very long time.

 $\label{eq:weak_process} \mbox{ We saw that with the PFS process and the fact that} \\ \mbox{in New Jersey} \mbox{ --}$

JUDGE HARZ: Okay. All right.

So, Mr. Elias, do you have an objection to an order being entered that directs that this process must be undertaken now on all the cases? I mean, it sounded to me like that's what you were doing anyway.

MR. ELIAS: Your Honor, we don't have an objection to that short of an order. That is what we are doing anyway.

The only thing that we object to is an order that puts, as you said, time frames in that extinguished the claims if something isn't done within a certain time. We

think your suggestion is perfectly reasonable that we continue to do what we're already doing and then revisit this issue in four months and see where we're at. And we support that.

JUDGE HARZ: All right. Could I ask, Mr. Elias, could you put --

Judge Baker, would you be -- as the magistrate overseeing all this, do you want to enter that order, or do you want this Court to enter that order?

JUDGE BAKER: Well, since I -- I'm happy to do whatever you'd like, Judge Harz. And I'd like to be of assistance.

I just -- I don't have the least idea of what the surrogacy procedures are in New Jersey or elsewhere, frankly. But I can certainly set deadlines and get things in motion, if that would help move things along.

JUDGE HARZ: That would be great. That would be great. Yes, I would appreciate that.

And I think it's just to reflect the concern of the defense to make sure that the plaintiffs on each case are taking the necessary steps presently to have an appropriate representative substitution and that in four months' time there will be a report to the Court regarding the status for each case. Something to that effect.

Because that's what I'm understanding, Mr. Elias 1 2 and defense counsel, you both agree on. Well, actually, 3 defense counsel wants a set period of time, but I'm not 4 giving that. I think that's the concern, just that to make 5 sure that action is being taken now, beginning now. Okay. So is that the end of that issue? 6 7 JUDGE DALTON: I think so. I think so, unless the 8 lawyers have anything else they want to talk to Judge Harz 9 about with respect to those death cases. And Judge Baker 10 will enter an order reflecting the discussion. 11 I wanted to circle back just before I leave it for 12 good. 13 MR. REISSAUS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. 14 JUDGE DALTON: Yes. 15 MR. REISSAUS: Mr. Hollingsworth just passed me a 16 note. 17 We do have cases that are in the case-specific 18 workup pool that have issues with deceased patients who --19 there's questions in those. And we're a little bit --20 JUDGE HARZ: Those are MCLs? Those are MCL cases 21 or MDL cases? 22 MR. REISSAUS: One in the MCL and two in the MDL. 23 MR. ELIAS: Just to be clear, the two -- there's 24 two in the MDL. One is a plaintiff that did die prior to

the Complaint being filed. We are dismissing that case.

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We've already agreed that we will dismiss the case without 2 prejudice and refile appropriately. 3 The other one, I think, involves just the proof of representation, which we are working on. So those are the 4 5 only two --6 JUDGE HARZ: Okay. And the MCL, what's the status 7 of that one? 8 MR. REISSAUS: Just a moment, Judge Harz. 9 opening up my notes on that particular case. 10 JUDGE HARZ: Okay. I put you on the spot there 11 with that. Sorry. 12 MR. REISSAUS: So I'm not sure that we have -- he 13 passed away after the filing of the Complaint, and I'm not 14 sure that we have proof of representation yet. 15 And I'm looking at Ms. Wichmann. Am I being 16 accurate there? 17 MS. WICHMANN: That is correct. 18 MR. REISSAUS: Thank you. 19 JUDGE BAKER: Are you going to be substituting --20 wrong word perhaps -- but putting in another case-specific 21 plaintiff to cover the one that's going to be dismissed 22 without prejudice? 23 MR. ELIAS: Correct. We will -- the appropriate 24 representative of the estate will be added. 25 JUDGE BAKER: No, but I'm talking about for the

case-specific discovery schedule. 2 MR. ELIAS: Oh, for that particular case. We're 3 going to have to -- there's really not a procedure, I think, to substitute. So we're going to have to dismiss 4 5 the case --JUDGE BAKER: I understand. What I'm saying is, 6 7 are you going to take another plaintiff to go into the pool 8 of case-specific discovery because that case will 9 disappear. 10 JUDGE DALTON: It's not going to disappear. It's 11 going to --12 JUDGE BAKER: Well, it's not going to be refiled 13 and ready for deposition any time soon. 14 MR. ELIAS: It's not going to be refiled and ready 15 for deposition. And since that was an MDL case, that was 16 based on the cases that were filed in the Middle District 17 of Florida. So there really wasn't a selection beyond 18 that, I think, if I understand correctly, for the MDL. 19 So there isn't really another case to put into the 20 pool unless the court orders another case. 21 JUDGE BAKER: Well, that's what I was trying to 22 find out. Do we need to order another case to go into the 23 pool? 24 MR. ELIAS: Well, I think we have our work cut out

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for us as it.

JUDGE BAKER: Well, I understand. 1 2 MR. ELIAS: I would say no, but I'll let 3 defense --4 MR. REISSAUS: It's a defense pick. 5 MR. ELIAS: It's not a defense pick. It's an MDL 6 case. 7 JUDGE DALTON: It sounds like you ought to just cancel that case-specific discovery and focus on the cases 8 9 that are in the procedural posture where discovery is 10 prepared to go forward. 11 I mean, your position remains the same, right, with respect to your Lexecon rights. You're not going to 12 13 waive your Lexecon rights. So that means that I'm 14 constrained in terms of case-specific discovery to cases 15 that are in the Middle District if I want to -- I mean, I'm 16 not constrained to that. I can order case-specific 17 discovery in the others. 18 But my inclination is to confine it, as I said 19 before, to the Middle District cases because then I retain 20 control over those. And if I want to try those cases, then I can do it. 21 22 MR. REISSAUS: So, I'm sorry, I think I was 23 talking across Mr. Elias, at least. And so we have three 24 cases in the discovery pool that this applies, that there

are issues on this, two in the MDL that are Middle District

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of Florida cases, the first which is being -- you are voluntarily dismissing and refiling.

MR. ELIAS: Correct.

MR. REISSAUS: The second that, I guess, there's

-- you're working on proof of representation or -- establishing a representative authority. They are opening an estate, is my understanding.

MR. ELIAS: I think it's -- I don't know if it's already opened or not. That case is not going to be dismissed. That case is going to have proof of proper representation. So that doesn't really affect the discovery.

MR. REISSAUS: Well, there's not a proper plaintiff in the case. So I hate to take discovery that may not be valid during that time. So perhaps we need to touch base with plaintiffs about that.

JUDGE BAKER: Well, yeah. Let me suggest that you all continue your conferring on this, and in the next discovery report that's due in however many days talk about it.

MR. REISSAUS: Okay. Can we make it --

JUDGE DALTON: So these ought to obviously be pushed to the back of your discovery period in terms of the case-specific discovery so that it doesn't keep you from making forward progress on, I think, some of these

milestones met.

MR. REISSAUS: Of course. Everything is in parallel.

And then with regard to the New Jersey MCL case, I think we would want to replace that case. There's five plaintiff picks, five defense picks there. We wouldn't want to be four and five at this early of a stage.

MR. ELIAS: And I will just say that is a case that we are dismissing because it was a plaintiff that predeceased. Is that the case?

If it is the case we're dismissing, then we don't object to them picking another case in the MCL. But I don't think we're dismissing this case. I don't think it's a case that needs to be dismissed.

You can raise that -- and Judge Harz is on the phone. She can speak for herself. But if you all can't reach some accommodation to even out your MCL cases 5 and 5 based on the procedural posture of the case, then I'm sure Judge Harz will be happy to decide for you. But you all, it seems to me, ought to be able to figure that out.

JUDGE HARZ: It sounds to me you can figure it out. I mean, if it's being dismissed, then you have to just pick another one, if it's a plaintiffs' pick or a defense pick, whichever one it is.

MR. ELIAS: Fair enough.

JUDGE HARZ: Okay.

JUDGE DALTON: So let me -- where I was headed is going back to these depositions. Because one of the things that I would like to try to do is to give you some insight into what I'll be looking at.

I would say, Mr. Reissaus, that as I said, I don't presume to know all the facts in the case at all, but it's just hard for me to imagine that you couldn't substantially cover the waterfront with a prescribing physician on most of the things that you care about or need to inquire about in a couple of hours.

And so I would tell you that something you all might want to think about talking about is passing the baton at the two-hour mark and -- in other words, if you get to two hours with a witness and you're not finished, I think it would probably be prudent for you to pass the baton and let the plaintiffs then undertake an inquiry, and then if there's time remaining, come back and finish up. And maybe do that over the course of a couple depositions and see how things shake out.

I just will tell you in advance that if I get the first transcript and the defense, you know, asks four and a half hours' worth of questions and the doctor is frazzled and fit to be tied and ready to get out of there and it

prejudices the plaintiffs in terms of not being able to, you know, get done what they need to get done, then you're going to be looking at probably something that you would think is Draconian coming from me in terms of cabining your time, you know.

And you don't want me in a situation where I say, okay, Novartis, you've abused the process. Now you get an hour and no more. You know, do the best you can. I don't think anybody wants to end up there. So I just am telling you that my thinking is that two hours with a prescribing physician ought to give you more than enough time.

And I'm certainly not suggesting you need to take two hours, but I'm just saying that if you get to the two-hour mark and you're not finished, Mr. Elias,
Mr. Silverman, you know, my suggestion would be that you maybe step up and say pass the baton, let us have a go.

And I'm not requiring you to do it. I'm not ordering you to do it. I'm just telling you that that seems to me to be a relatively equitable way to move forward and to not abuse the process.

So I'm not -- again, I'm not ordering it. I'm just telling you that I'm going to look at what happens and see how you all conduct yourselves. My hope is that, you know, you'll find that you're able to knock these things out in, you know, two or three hours and be respectful of

the physician's time and share your time such that there are no real substantial significant fights over it.

I suspect that's kind of where we're going to end up, but it sounds like you need a little help here on the front end. So I'm just telling you, at the two-hour mark, I think the flag ought to go up and say that's time to pass the baton. Okay?

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you.

JUDGE DALTON: All right. What else can we get -how about from the lawyers? What can we do to help you
since I have you here?

MR. ELIAS: Yeah, one issue I think that we do need to address, we have a mediation deadline of December 9th, which from the plaintiffs' perspective we'd like to get -- we'd like to move forward on and get scheduled. The defense has said that they want to wait and push that until after more fact-specific discovery.

So I do think that that's something that the Court should be aware of. It hasn't been briefed or anything before you, but we would like to -- we think it makes sense to mediate now rather than, rather than later.

And we've already had extensive attempts at mediation, but it is a process. And while it may not get resolved, the mediation -- in the mediation in December, I think it can continue us on our path towards potential

resolution.

JUDGE DALTON: Well, the mediation date, if memory serves me right, was set before we extended some of these other deadlines.

MR. ELIAS: Correct.

JUDGE DALTON: So I hear you, Mr. Elias, that, you know, oftentimes it's hard to figure out exactly what's the most productive, whether, you know, an earlier mediation date. At this point you guys have already got a lot invested in the discovery of this case.

I'll hear from Mr. Reissaus in terms of what Novartis would like to do.

What I don't want to do is order you into a process where the parties feel like they don't have enough information or their clients feel like they don't have enough information, you know, to make an informed decision about resolving the case.

Let me hear from you, Mr. Reissaus, about that.

MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

The parties, as Mr. Elias alluded to, continue to talk during the pendency of the MDL. And based on the current state of discussions, there's a distance between the parties. And, you know, we had serious discussions, but at this point we believe that plaintiffs are looking for Novartis to bid against itself. And that's really a

showstopper at this stage of the litigation.

And we don't think that mediating by December 9th is the right time to do that right now.

JUDGE DALTON: Okay. Well, I don't want to get into the weeds on, you know, who's negotiating in good faith and who's not and whose bid it is, but I am sensitive to two things.

One is that I appreciate the fact that Novartis might want to have at least one or two of these treating docs deposed so that they kind of get the lay of the land on is this going to be a productive exercise for us in terms of this causation defense. Mr. Johnston is not here, but I can hear him now, you know, pounding the table about that, about that issue. And I say that without criticism.

So I think, frankly, in order to give you all, meaning I'm looking at the plaintiffs, the best shot at having a receptive audience, that if I force you to mediation prior to getting any of that done, even one or two of those docs done, it's not likely to be productive.

So what I would be inclined to do is to extend that mediation date in the MDL cases from its current date of December 9 and maybe add the 45 days that we have added to the discovery period. And let's reset it at a period that's 45 days from December the 9th, and then leave it to you all to get that coordinated and scheduled.

And, you know, if you all feel like you want to do it in 20 days, I mean, I'd be happy about that, but I want to give you an outside limit by which I want to see it accomplished.

And that will do two things. It will add some incentive to you to get some of this discovery scheduled, set, and in the can so that you know what to expect and you can communicate it to your clients.

And it will also give you, I think, an opportunity to look at the prospects of mediation in light of sort of harbinger of the costs and time consumption that you're looking at down the road. And you'll have, you know, probably a better -- you'll be on more equal footing, I think, in terms of your knowledge about where the case could ultimately end up.

JUDGE BAKER: Let me add, I don't -- I think you do, but I don't know this mediator we've approved. I don't know what his practices are.

Does he require mediation statements that you submit to him in advance? And does he keep you there until he's exhausted, or does he adjourn things?

MR. REISSAUS: I'll let Mr. Elias respond after me if he feels it's necessary.

But we've worked with Mr. Caparello previously, and we've submitted mediation statements. I think at this

point he knows the parties and is pretty comfortable. I expect we would want to submit something to him in writing before we had another session with him and he would accept it.

JUDGE BAKER: It's sort of a paradigm. But then yet I've seen probably -- I won't even hazard a guess, but it's hundreds, if not thousands, of mediation reports, many of which are continuing, and I've never quite known how that fits our deadline. Because we set a deadline, expect it to be done. But mediations continue a life of their own depending on the mediator and the parties.

MR. REISSAUS: Okay. I'm sorry.

JUDGE BAKER: So you're talking about having that session, but that may not be the end of it as long as there's a report. So I'm just trying to get a feel.

MR. REISSAUS: So I can give you a little more -Mr. Caparello stayed engaged after our prior sessions. And
he kept us in the room until it was clear we were not going
to conclude that day and -- but that didn't necessarily end
his work so --

JUDGE BAKER: Well, that's typical.

MR. REISSAUS: Yeah, I mean --

JUDGE DALTON: Well, let me tell you what my expectation is. My expectation is that within 45 days you're going to have done whatever the mediator requires

you to do in terms of your submissions, you are going to have had your substantive mediation conference, and you're going to notify me the case is either settled or impassed. If you want to continue, then you're going to need to ask for permission to continue beyond that date.

I don't want to ever throw cold water on productive discussions if they're moving forward in a productive way, but I don't want this deadline to be seen as just some, you know, aspirational goal that we must all at least get in the same room between now and 45 days.

My expectation is you'll have a substantive mediation conference and resolve the case or come to the place where you cannot resolve the case and it's going to move forward on a trial track.

So and, you know, I think -- I mean, I haven't worked with Mr. Caparello a lot. I know him. I know him both personally and by reputation. And I think you made a good selection here.

But I do want to echo what Judge Baker said. I'm not looking at this to be just, you know, a let's schedule our first meeting. If you schedule your first meeting and the talks are productive and you've got loose ends, you know, or other things that need to be done and you can come back with a reasonable request for an extension to try to continue, I'm open to that. I'm not suggesting I'm not

open to it. But I don't want you to see that date as 2 being, as I said, aspirational. Okay? 3 MR. ELIAS: Understood. 4 MR. REISSAUS: Yes, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE DALTON: And I think, you know, the practical matter, I mean, this is -- this is 6 7 November the 15th. December the 9th. You know, 8 for you all to come up with submissions and get a date on 9 his calendar between now and the intervention of the 10 Thanksgiving holiday, you know, that's probably not going 11 to happen anyway. 12 So if it's going to happen, it ought to happen 13 with both parties being fully invested, fully motivated to 14 try to get to a -- you know, and I say this, again, not to 15 be flippant, you know, Mr. Elias, but in my years, I mean, 16 people said do you want to mediate, I said any time you 17 want to have a meeting the purpose of which is to pay me or 18 my clients money, I'll show up. 19 What else? What else can we help you with? 20 MR. REISSAUS: I believe we had one other topic. 21 And this should be quick. 22 There are four cases in the MDL where we did not 23 And plaintiffs have provided two of those yet have PFSs. 24 There are two cases where we don't have a PFS PFSs now.

yet. And under the CMO for the PFS process, I'm sorry, the

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pretrial order, we have -- on November 22nd would be 2 the deadline to provide those. 3 And so we'd like to request leave to file a motion to dismiss if we don't receive those two PFSs by 4 5 November 22. JUDGE DALTON: Yes. I think the order 6 7 contemplates that. But to the extent that it doesn't, then 8 you certainly have leave to file a motion to terminate 9 those cases if they're not in compliance in terms of 10 providing you with your PFS. 11 MR. REISSAUS: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 JUDGE DALTON: You're welcome. 13 All right. Anything else? Mr. Elias, Mr. Silverman? 14 15 MR. SILVERMAN: No, Your Honor. JUDGE DALTON: Ms. Wichmann? No. 16 17 Anything else from the defense? 18 All right. Well, thank you all. Keep up the good 19 work. 20 I do want to just circle back to what Judge Baker 21 mentioned in terms of, you know, project manager in terms 22 of the scheduling of this case-specific discovery. If we 23 can be helpful with that, you might want to think about it. 24 Because one of the things that it does do, it 25 gives the physicians sort of a central location in terms of

talking to the plaintiffs, talking to the defendants, 2 trying to coordinate dates, trying to deal with their 3 scheduling person. You know, I mean, in my experience, some of them 4 5 have schedulers that are very sharp and on top of things. 6 Others, you know, your request for a date goes into the 7 black hole and you never hear back. 8 And so the project -- a project manager would be 9 able -- you know, would be a central location that would be 10 able to have dates from you all, know what was suitable on 11 both your calendars and help coordinate that. And it's not 12 a big expense, but it can be helpful. 13 Judge Baker has a lot of experience with it. So 14 I'll just leave that to you all. But if you want to 15 revisit that or raise that with him, I'm sure he'd be open 16 to it. 17 Thank you. MR. SILVERMAN: 18 JUDGE DALTON: All right. Great. 19 Anything else, Judge Harz, before we let you go? 20 JUDGE HARZ: I'm good. Thank you very much for 21 asking. 22 JUDGE DALTON: Okay. Great. 23 All right. We'll be in recess then. Thank you 24 all. 25 (Proceedings adjourned at 11:09 a.m.)

<u>CERTIFICATE</u> I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. November 18, 2022 s\ Amie R. First Amie R. First, RDR, CRR, CRC, CPE Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court Middle District of Florida